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ABSTRACT 
Syungjin Han: Foreign Investors, Stock Price Informativeness, and Multinational Corporations 
(Under the direction of Christian T. Lundblad) 
 
 This study investigates the impact of foreign investors on stock price informativeness 
across 44 stock markets worldwide. I find that the positive relation between foreign institutional 
ownership and stock return volatility is moderated in firms with a larger proportion of foreign 
operations. This implies a stabilizing effect of foreign investors on stock prices of multinational 
corporations (MNCs). In addition, I find that current stock prices reflect more information about 
future earnings generated from foreign operations of firms with higher foreign institutional 
ownership. These results suggest that foreign investors have an informational advantage about 
foreign businesses of MNCs due to geographic proximity and such information is incorporated 
into local stock prices by their trading. Furthermore, I find that the type of information that 
foreign investors gather and interpret is about the demand for a firm’s products rather than about 
the technology used by the firm. Overall, this paper proposes a benefit of financial liberalization 
that foreign investors facilitate the transmission of information about foreign operations of 
MNCs in local stock markets. 
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FOREIGN INVESTORS, STOCK PRICE INFORMATIVENESS, 
AND MULITINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 
 
 
1    Introduction 
            There has been considerable controversy over the informational role of foreign investors 
in the international finance literature. According to the literature on equity home bias, foreign 
investors are less informed relative to domestic investors (Karolyi and Stulz (2003), and Hau 
(2001)) because they are geographically distant. Their trading behaviors such as positive 
feedback trading and herding (Choe et al. (1999)) may destabilize stock prices moving away 
from fundamental values. On the other hand, much empirical evidence shows that foreign 
investors are sophisticated informed investors (Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000), and Karolyi 
(2002)). Consequently, their trades facilitate the incorporation of information moving stock 
prices in the direction to fundamental values (Bae et al. (2012), Gul et al. (2010), and He et al. 
(2013)). 
            This paper proposes a specific channel through which foreign shareholding improves 
stock price informativeness of local stock markets. I posit that foreign investors may know better 
about foreign operations of multinational corporations (MNCs) due to geographic proximity. 
Investors who are local to countries where foreign subsidiaries of MNCs operate have lower 
costs to collect and process information. Stock prices of MNCs in local stock markets become 
more informative with the presence of foreign investors since information about foreign 
operations of MNCs is incorporated into stock prices by their trading. For example, U.S. 
investors may have an informational advantage about the sales prospects for U.S. operations of 
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Hyundai (a Korean motor company) relative to Korean investors since they know better about its 
reputation, customer satisfaction and competition with other firms in the U.S. automotive market. 
Thus, by trading of U.S. investors in the Korea stock exchange, Hyundai’s stock prices 
incorporate such information.  
            To investigate the impact of foreign investors on stock price informativeness, I examine 
the relation between foreign institutional ownership and stock return volatility. If foreign 
investors are less informed, their positive feedback trading and herding can push prices away 
from fundamental values and increase volatility (LONG et al. (1990)). In contrast, if foreign 
investors are informed investors, they bet against noise-driven price movements and so dampen 
them (Freidman (1953)). In the literature on noise trading and market efficiency, informed 
rational speculators are traders to move prices in the direction to fundamental values by trading 
against noise traders, even if risk aversion keeps them from taking large positions to eliminate 
noise trader risk (De Long et al. (1990), and Campbell and Kyle (1993)). 
            The sample includes 24,089 firms in 44 countries during the period from 2001 to 2012. I 
run regressions of stock return volatility on foreign institutional ownership, controlling for the 
firm characteristics known as the determinants of volatility and including country, industry and 
year fixed effects. I find a positive association between foreign institutional ownership and 
volatility, whereas I find a negative association between domestic institutional ownership and 
volatility. These results imply that foreign institutional investors destabilize prices, whereas 
domestic institutional investors play a stabilizing role in stock markets.  
            To test the main hypothesis that foreign investors facilitate the incorporation of 
information about foreign operations of MNCs in local stock prices, I investigate the interaction 
term between foreign institutional ownership and the extent to which firms generate sales in 
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foreign countries. I find a negative interaction between foreign institutional ownership and the 
ratio of foreign sales to total sales. The destabilizing effect of foreign investors is attenuated as 
firms have a larger proportion of foreign operations. Compared to firms in the lowest foreign 
sales tertile, the coefficient for foreign institutional ownership is reduced almost half in firms in 
the highest foreign sales tertile. A 10% increase in foreign institutional ownership is associated 
with a 5.97% increase in volatility for firms in the lowest foreign sales tertile and a 3.29% 
increase in volatility for firms in the highest foreign sales tertile. This implies that foreign 
investors have an informational advantage about foreign operations and have a stabilizing effect 
on stock prices of MNCs.  
 Furthermore, I look into what type of information foreign investors gather and interpret. I 
examine whether the information is about the demand for a firm’s products or about its 
technology. Investors may have better access to local market and industry information. It 
provides them with an informational advantage about the firm’s reputation, customer satisfaction, 
and competition with other firms in the local product markets. On the other hand, investors may 
have better ability to gain information about the technology used by the firm since they can talk 
to their managers, employees and suppliers of the local firms. To distinguish these explanations, 
I examine whether the stabilizing effect of foreign investors increases as a firm has a larger 
proportion of foreign sales or of foreign assets. I find that not foreign assets but foreign sales are 
the statistically significant determinants of the foreign institutional ownership-volatility relation. 
This implies that foreign investors have an advantage in processing information about the sales 
prospects for MNCs, but not about the operating efficiency of MNCs’ foreign subsidiaries. The 
informational advantage of foreign investors about foreign operations of MNCs stems from 
4 
 
geographic proximity not to the location of their foreign subsidiaries but to the location of their 
product markets. 
 To provide more direct evidence, I investigate whether current stock prices contain more 
information about future earnings generated from foreign operations of MNCs as foreign 
institutional ownership increases. I modify the future earnings response coefficient (FERC) 
model, which I borrow from the accounting literature (Collins et al. (1994), and Orpurt and Zang 
(2009)). I decompose earnings into earnings generated from foreign and domestic operations so 
that I can examine stock price informativeness by location of operations. I find that current stock 
returns are more strongly positively associated with future earnings from foreign operations with 
higher foreign institutional ownership. The positive relation between foreign institutional 
ownership and the FERC is robust after controlling for the firm characteristics known to affect 
the FERC. The result suggests that foreign investors facilitate the incorporation of information 
about future earnings from foreign operations of MNCs.  
 This paper contributes to the literature which documents that distance is an important 
factor to the quality of information. An informational advantage of local investors is one of the 
factors to explain the home bias (Karolyi and Stulz (2003)). Even in the U.S. market, Coval and 
Moskowitz (1999) and Coval and Moskowitz (2001) show that U.S. mutual funds exhibit strong 
preference for stocks of the firms whose corporate headquarters are geographically more 
proximate and have better performance with such local stocks. While those studies are focused 
on the performance and holdings of investors, this paper looks into an impact on stock prices. It 
suggests that the geographic location of investors has a significant effect on price efficiency. 
 Next, this paper contributes to the literature on the informational benefit of financial 
liberalization. Bae et al. (2012) documents that foreign investors have an advantage in processing 
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global market information and the speed of incorporation of global market information into stock 
prices increases with the greater accessibility of foreign investors in emerging markets. Other 
studies related to this paper are Gul et al. (2010) and He et al. (2013). They find that stock prices 
have become more informative with the presence of foreign investors using firm-specific return 
variation as a stock price informativeness measure. This study complements the literature by 
proposing a specific mechanism through which foreign investors improve price informativeness 
of local stock markets. It suggests that the geographic proximity of foreign investors to foreign 
operations of firms facilitates the improvement of the price efficiency of MNCs’ stocks. This 
effect is significant under prominent corporate investment globalization. 
 Last, this paper contributes to the accounting literature on the future earnings response 
coefficient (FERC) model. A long strand of research follows after Collins et al. (1994) first 
proposed the FERC, which gauges the sensitivity of current stock returns to changes in expected 
future earnings as a measure of stock price informativeness. This paper is the first paper to 
decompose earnings by their origin and study stock price informativeness of firms by location of 
their operations.  
 This paper has a potential implication on the real effect of financial liberalization since 
stock price informativeness determines the efficiency of capital allocation (Levine (1997)). 
Corporate managers can learn the prospects for their own firm’s projects in foreign countries 
from stock prices which incorporate information foreign investors have but manager may not 
have (Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2007)). Considering the prominence of foreign investment of 
MNCs and information costs due to geographic separation, foreign investors could be an 
important source of information to corporate managers when they make investment decisions.  
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 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the central 
hypothesis. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 discusses the empirical results of the main 
regression analysis. Section 5 discusses additional analysis with an alternative stock price 
informativeness measure. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2    Prior Literature and Hypothesis Development           
 The equity home bias literature suggests that informational disadvantage of investors 
about foreign stocks is one of the indirect barriers to international investment. It proposes 
geographic distance as a factor to explain why investors know less about foreign stocks than 
about domestic stocks (Karolyi and Stulz (2003)). Many studies find that the distance between 
the location of investors and firms matters with respect to asymmetric distribution of information 
among agents. Hau (2001) uses geographic trader locations as proxies for information 
asymmetry in the German stock market and finds that traders outside Germany show lower 
proprietary trading profits. Of U.S. evidence, Coval and Moskowitz (1999) and Coval and 
Moskowitz (2001) show that the holdings of a U.S. stock by U.S. mutual funds are negatively 
correlated with the distance between the location of the funds and the corporate headquarters of 
the firms and funds have better performance with the stocks located more closely to where the 
funds are located. 
 On the other hand, there is some conflicting evidence with the argument that foreign 
investors are less informed than domestic investors. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) show that the 
portfolios of foreign investors outperform the portfolios of households in Finland. Karolyi (2002) 
documents that foreign investors in Japan equities outperformed Japanese individuals and 
institutions during the Asian financial crisis period. Both papers argue that foreign investors do 
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better because most of foreign investors are institutions and, therefore, they have the expertise, 
experience, and resources to conduct the firm research.  
 Reconciling two conflicting views about foreign investors, I conjecture that foreign 
investors have an advantage in gathering and interpreting information about the prospects for 
foreign operations of firms due to their geographic proximity. While foreign investors are located 
geographically distant from the location of domestic operations, they are close to the location of 
foreign operations. Foreign investors would trade and capitalize on such information which 
would be incorporated into stock prices of the firms in local stock markets. Following the 
argument, I construct the main hypothesis that foreign investors have an advantage in processing 
information about foreign operations of MNCs and their informed trading enhances stock price 
informativeness of the MNCs. 
 
3    Data 
 In this section, I describe the sample selection procedure, the measurement of the main 
variables and the summary statistics of variables for the sample firms. 
 
3.1    Sample Selection    
 To construct the sample, I use three main sources of the data in the analysis. The first 
databases are Compustat Global and Compustat North America, from which I collect stock 
market data such as total return prices,
1
 market capitalization and most of accounting data. The 
second database is Datastream/Worldscope, where I obtain local market index returns and 
                                                          
1
 I adjust stock prices to account for stock splits and dividend payments. The total return prices are 
calculated using the following formula:        
              
        
, where TRCi,d = total return price, 
PRCCDi,d = daily closing price, TRFDi,d = daily total return factor, and AJEXDIi,d = daily adjustment 
factor cumulative by ex-date. 
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segment accounting data such as foreign sales, foreign assets and foreign income. I restrict the 
sample to firms which report foreign sales. The third database is FactSet/LionShares, where I 
draw institutional holdings data. The final sample contains 23 developed markets and 21 
emerging markets and consists of 24,089 unique firms with 136,980 firm-year observations over 
the sample period from 2001 to 2012. 
 
3.2    Stock Return Volatility 
 Shiller (1981) claims that stock prices are too volatile to be justified by news about future 
dividends in the simple present value model. De Long et al. (1990) and Campbell and Kyle 
(1993) attribute such excessive volatility to noise trading. In their models, sophisticated informed 
investors take arbitrage positions against noise traders. It prevents prices from moving away 
from fundamental values. However, since arbitragers are likely to be risk averse, their 
willingness to bet against noise traders is limited. As a result, noise trading can destabilize stock 
prices. Their models predict that if sophisticated informed investors increase relative to noise 
traders in stock markets, stock prices would be stabilized by their informed arbitrage trading.  
 On the other hand, when positive feedback traders form a herd their trading can have a 
destabilizing impact on stock prices (Choe et al. (1999)). Positive feedback traders can push 
prices higher (lower) by buying (selling) following price increases (decreases). If their trading is 
not based on information about fundamentals, it moves prices away from fundamental values. 
Rational speculators have the limits of arbitrage dedicated to exploiting positive feedback traders’ 
misperceptions (De Long et al. (1990)) and can even take advantage of their behaviors 
contributing to the destabilizing effect (LONG et al. (1990)).  
 For each year, I estimate a firm-level measure of stock return volatility during the period 
from 2001 to 2012. Specifically, I calculate the standard deviation of a firm’s weekly stock 
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returns
2
 in a given year and annualize it with multiplying by    . The firm-year observations are 
included in the sample if they have return data for at least 40 weeks. There is a large variation of 
volatility across countries. Table 1 shows that, on average, countries with the highest volatility 
are Canada (98%), Australia (60%), and Unites States (58%) and. Countries with the lowest 
volatility are Chile (26%), New Zealand (29%), and Colombia (30%). This calls for including 
country fixed effects in the regression analysis. 
 
3.3    Institutional Ownership 
 I use institutional ownership during the period 2000 to 2011 because I study the effect of 
institutional ownership (one-year lagged) on the future level of stock return volatility from 2001 
to 2012. The institutional holdings data are drawn from the FactSect/LionShares database, a 
leading information source for global institutional ownership. The database covers institutions 
defined as professional money managers with discretionary control over assets such as mutual 
funds, pension funds, bank trusts, and insurance companies (see Ferreira and Matos (2008) for 
more details). 
 IO_FOR is defined as the sum of the holdings of all institutions domiciled in a different 
country from the origin country of the firm, expressed as a percentage of the firm’s market 
capitalization at the end of the calendar years. IO_DOM is the sum of the holdings of all 
institutions domiciled in the same country as the origin country of the firm as a percentage of the 
firm’s market capitalization at the end of the calendar years. To deal with the different reporting 
frequency of institutions, the latest holdings update at each year end is used to calculate 
                                                          
2
 I calculate weekly stock returns using total return prices accounting for stock splits and dividend 
payments by the following formula:     
             
       
, where TRCi,w = Wednesday closing price in 
week w and TRCi,w-1 = Wednesday closing price in week w-1 
10 
 
institutional ownership annually. Following Ferreira and Matos (2008), I set institutional 
ownership variables to zero if a stock is not held by any institution in FactSet/LionShares. 
 Table 1 shows that, on average, countries with the highest foreign institutional ownership 
are Canada (15%), Turkey (15%) and Ireland (14%), while countries with the lowest foreign 
institutional ownership are Colombia (1%), Malaysia (1%), and China (2%). In the U.S., 
domestic institutional ownership (40%) dominates foreign institutional ownership (3%). But in 
most countries, foreign institutional ownership exceeds domestic institutional ownership except 
in Canada, Denmark, Norway, Poland, Sweden, and United Kingdom.  
 
3.4    Foreign Operations 
 
 I use foreign sales scaled by total sales and foreign assets scaled by total assets to 
measure the extent of a firm’s foreign operations. Foreign sales, foreign assets, total sales, and 
total assets are obtained from Datastream/Worldscope database. Foreign sales are defined as 
sales generated from goods produced and sold abroad and foreign assets represent assets of 
foreign operations. The limitation of the data is that foreign sales and foreign assets are not 
reported by country-level segment. Because of that constraint, I could not match sales and assets 
with institutional ownership by country-level. But I expect that inclusion of investors from 
different countries when calculating institutional ownership biases against finding support for my 
hypothesis. 
 Figure 1 plots the averages of foreign sales and foreign assets by geographic region. 
Foreign sales are the highest in Europe (57%) and the lowest in South America (28%). Likewise, 
foreign assets are the highest in Europe (34%) and the lowest in South America (9%). It seems 
that firms in Europe have much higher foreign operations since the low investment restriction 
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resulted from the effort of EU to achieve a single market fosters corporate investment within the 
local region. 
 On average, firms in developed markets have higher foreign operations (44% foreign 
sales, and 29% foreign assets) than firms in emerging markets (22% foreign sales, and 12% 
foreign assets) as you see Table 1. Figure 2 shows that in both developed and emerging markets, 
foreign sales have increased gradually while foreign assets have not changed much over the 
sample period from 2001 to 2012. Corporate operations have globalized around the world with 
respect to sales over the sample period. 
 
3.5    Firm Characteristics 
 In principle, firm characteristics should be included in the analysis as control variables to 
correct the omitted variable bias problem if they affect foreign institutional ownership and also 
stock return volatility. I include a comprehensive list of firm characteristics based on the related 
prior study (Rubin and Smith (2009)). I obtain the data from Datastream, Compustat Global, 
Compustat North America to measure the firm characteristics.  
 Small firms are more focused, specializing in limited operations than large firms which 
are more diversified and, therefore, small firms tend to react more to idiosyncratic shocks (Rubin 
and Smith (2009)). To control for the size of the firms, I use the log of market value of the equity 
(SIZE).  
 Pastor and Pierto (2003) documented that MB increases with uncertainty about 
profitability and, therefore, high growth firms have more volatile returns. I measure MB by the 
market value of equity divided by the book value of equity. For the similar reason, young firms 
of which the future profitability is more uncertain show higher volatility. I define AGE as the 
number of years since the firms appear on Datastream. In addition, non-dividend paying firms 
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have more information asymmetry with more uncertain prospects and consequently have more 
volatile returns than dividend paying firms. I include a dummy variable, DIV, which indicates 
whether a firm pays dividends during the year.  
 The use of debt amplifies variability of profitability due to the leverage effect and, as a 
result, is likely to increase stock return volatility. To control for the leverage effect, I use the 
long-term debt divided by the market value of equity. Wei and Zhang (2006) argue that the 
upward trend of stock return volatility is accounted for by the downward trend of the return-on-
equity and the upward trend of volatility of the return-on-equity. To control for the accounting 
profitability effect, I include ROE, which is defined as net income before extraordinary items 
divided by the book value of equity, and its volatility. I estimate the standard deviation of annual 
ROE measures using the previous 6 years to measure volatility of profitability (VOLP). I include 
the firm-year observations that have at least 4 years of ROE in the sample. 
 I winsorize variables such as VOL, SIZE, MB, LEV, ROE and VOLP at the upper and 
lower 1%. 
 
4    Foreign Institutional Ownership and Stock Return Volatility 
 In this section, I examine whether foreign investors promote the incorporation of 
information about foreign operations of MNCs in local stock markets using panel regressions 
with stock return volatility as the dependent variable. I test the hypothesis by investigating the 
impact of the extent to which firms engage in foreign operations on the foreign institutional 
ownership-volatility relation. Furthermore, I study whether the information that foreign investors 
have is about the sales prospects for foreign operations in product markets or about their 
operating efficiency by comparing the effects of the extent of sales generated from foreign 
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operations and assets being invested in foreign countries on the foreign institutional ownership-
volatility relation. 
 
4.1    Panel Regression Tests 
 The main prediction of this study is that since foreign investors know better about the 
prospects for foreign operations of firms, the stock prices become more informative with the 
presence of foreign investors as firms engage more in foreign operations. To test this prediction, 
I examine the effect of the extent of foreign operations on the relation between foreign 
institutional ownership and stock return volatility. I use foreign sales scaled by total sales to 
measure the extent to which firms have foreign operations. I expect that there is a negative 
impact of foreign sales on the foreign institutional ownership-volatility relation since if foreign 
investors are informed about foreign operation of MNCs, they will take arbitrage positions 
against noise traders, which reduces the volatility of MNCs. 
 In the tests, all the independent variables except the log of one plus age, foreign sales and 
the tertile membership of foreign sales are lagged by one year to examine the effects of current 
explanatory variables on future stock return volatility. That is, stock return volatility is for period 
t, and each independent variable is for period t-1. I include several firm-level control variables 
which are known as determinants of volatility in the literature (detailed discussion of firm 
characteristics appears on Section 3.5). I estimate ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions using 
firm-year panel during the 2001-2012 period. I include year dummies to account for positive 
time trend in volatility (Campbell et al. (2001)). In addition, I include country and industry fixed 
effects to control for unobserved country and industry-level time invariant characteristics that 
simultaneously determine foreign institutional ownership and volatility. I cluster standard errors 
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to account for serial correlation at the firm level (i.e., I assume that observations are independent 
across firms, but not within firm). 
 Column (1) of Table 4 shows that a 10% increase in foreign institutional ownership is 
associated with a subsequent increase in volatility by 4.55% and a 10% increase in domestic 
institutional ownership is associated with a subsequent decrease in volatility by 1.26%. Foreign 
institutional investors have a destabilizing role, while domestic institutional investors have a 
stabilizing role in stock markets. This result is consistent with the view that foreign investors are 
less-informed than domestic investors because of geographic separation. All the regression 
results in Table 4 show that small, high-growth, highly leveraged firms, firms with low 
accounting profitability, high volatility of profitability, non-dividend paying, and young firms 
exhibit high stock return volatility.  
 To test the main hypothesis, I investigate the interaction term between foreign 
institutional ownership and the extent of foreign operations of firms. I use foreign sales scaled by 
total sales and the tertile membership of foreign sales to measure the extent to which firms have 
operations in foreign countries. I find a negative interaction between foreign institutional 
ownership and foreign sales. The destabilizing effect of foreign investors is moderated as firms 
have a larger proportion of sales generated from foreign countries. The coefficient for foreign 
institutional ownership is reduced almost half in firms in the highest foreign sales tertile relative 
to firms in the lowest foreign sales tertile. A 10% increase in foreign institutional ownership is 
associated with a 5.97% increase in volatility for firms in the lowest foreign sales tertile and a 
3.29% increase in volatility for firms in the highest foreign sales tertile. These results imply that 
foreign investors are well-informed about the prospects for foreign operations of firms and have 
a stabilizing effect in stocks of MNCs by their arbitrage trading. 
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4.2    Type of Information 
 I investigate what type of information foreign investors have an advantage to gather and 
interpret. The information could be about the demand for a firm’s products or about its 
technology. Investors may have better access to local market and industry information. It 
provides them with an informational advantage about the firm’s reputation, customer satisfaction, 
and competition with other firms in the local product markets. On the other hand, investors may 
have better ability to gain information about the technology used by a firm since they can talk to 
its managers, employees and suppliers of the local firm. For example, U.S. investors have lower 
costs to gather information about the U.S. automotive market and, therefore, have better ability 
to obtain and interpret information about the U.S. customer demand for Hyundai (a Korean 
motor company) vehicles. Alternatively, U.S. investors are geographically proximate to the 
headquarter and manufacturing facilities of Hyundai’s U.S. operations and so have better access 
to local managers, employees and suppliers to obtain information about the technology of its U.S. 
subsidiary. 
 To distinguish these explanations, I examine whether the stabilizing effect of foreign 
investors increases as a firm has a larger proportion of foreign sales or foreign assets. If the 
information that foreign investors have is about the demand for a firm’s products, their 
stabilizing effect is likely to be higher as the extent of sales generated from foreign countries 
increases. On the other hand, if the information is about the technology of the firm, the effect is 
likely to be higher as the firm has a larger percentage of assets being invested in foreign 
countries.  
 Column (3) of Table 5 shows that the coefficient of the interaction term between foreign 
institutional ownership and foreign sales is negative and statistically significant at the 1%, 
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whereas the interaction term between foreign institutional ownership and foreign assets is 
positive and statistically insignificant. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that foreign 
investors have an informational advantage about the sales prospects for MNCs rather than about 
their operating efficiency. This implies that the informational advantage of foreign investors 
stems from geographic proximity to the location of their product markets not to the location of 
their foreign subsidiaries. 
 
5     Additional Analysis 
 In this section, I provide more direct tests whether foreign investors facilitate the 
incorporation of information about foreign operations of MNCs in local stock markets using an 
alternative stock price informativeness measure. I examine the impact of foreign institutional 
ownership on the extent of information reflected in stock prices about future earnings generated 
from foreign operations by modifying the future earnings coefficient (FERC) model.  
 
5.1    Alternative Stock Price Informativeness Measure 
 Borrowing from the accounting literature, I use the future earnings response coefficient 
(FERC) as an alternative stock price informativeness measure. The FERC is the regression 
coefficient of current stock returns on future earnings and indicates how much information stock 
prices contain about future earnings. I adapt the FERC model developed by Collins et al. (1994) 
and modified by Lundholm and Myers (2002) to study the extent of information reflected in 
stock prices about future earnings from foreign operations and future earnings from domestic 
operations separately.  
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 The current stock return can be characterized as the sum of three components: 
unexpected current earnings, the cumulative change in expectations about future earnings and 
noise as follows: 
                               
 
            ,                                                                  (1) 
where Rt is the annual stock return in year t, UXt is the unexpected earnings in year t defined as 
the annual earnings    less the prior period’s expectation (Et-1(Xt)), and ΔEt(Xt+i) is the change in 
expectations between time t-1 and t about future earnings in year t+i (Et-1(Xt+i) - Et(Xt+i)).  
 Following Lundholm and Myers (2002), I proxy for UXt using the level of Xt-1 and Xt. 
The earnings process is modeled in general specification allowing for random walk, white noise 
process, and AR (1) process. Regarding ΔEt(Xt+i), I proxy for Et(Xt+i) using realized future 
earnings and the prior expectation for future earnings (Et-1(Xt+i)) is captured by Xt-1. However, 
realized future earnings have expected and unexpected components. To control for the 
unexpected component of future earnings which is measurement error, future returns (Rt+i) are 
included. The time span of future earnings is limited to three years since investors revise their 
expectations over a relatively short horizon and adding more time periods increases little 
explanatory power of the model (Collins et al. (1994)). Then I have the following regression 
which is a condensed version of Lundholm and Myers (2002): 
                                                                                                         (2) 
where Rt is the buy-and-hold return for year t over the 12-month period ending three months 
after the year t fiscal year-end, Xt-1 is income available to common shareholders before 
extraordinary items in year t-1 scaled by market value of equity three months after the year t-1 
fiscal year-end (i.e. at the beginning of current return measurement), Xt is income available to 
common shareholders before extraordinary items in year t scaled by market value of equity three 
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months after the year t-1 fiscal year-end, X3t is the sum of income available to common 
shareholders before extraordinary items for three years following year t scaled by market value 
of equity three months after the year t-1 fiscal year-end, and R3t is the buy-and-hold return for 
the three-year period following year t starting three months after the year t fiscal year-end. 
 I modify this price-earnings relation to allow for separate measurement of ability of 
current returns to reflect earnings from foreign operations and domestic operations. I decompose 
earnings into earnings from foreign operations and domestic operations. I estimate the following 
regression: 
                                                          
                                                   ,                                                            (3) 
where Rt is the buy-and-hold return for year t over the 12-month period ending three months 
after the year t fiscal year-end, X_FORt-1 (X_DOMt-1) is income available to common 
shareholders before extraordinary items generated from operations in foreign countries (in home 
country) in year t-1 scaled by market value of equity three months after the year t-1 fiscal year-
end (i.e. at the beginning of current return measurement), X_FORt (X_DOMt) is income available 
to common shareholders before extraordinary items generated from operations in foreign 
countries (in home country) in year t scaled by market value of equity three months after the year 
t-1 fiscal year-end, X3_FORt (X3_DOMt) is the sum of income available to common 
shareholders before extraordinary items for three years following year t generated from 
operations in foreign countries (in home country) scaled by market value of equity three months 
after the year t-1 fiscal year-end, and R3t is the buy-and-hold return for the three-year period 
following year t starting three months after the year t fiscal year-end. 
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 To measure income available to common shareholders before extraordinary items by its 
origin, I obtain total operating income, foreign operating income and net interest income data 
from Datastream database. Domestic operating income is calculated as total operating income 
less foreign operating income. I allocate net interest income on the basis of the proportion of 
sales from foreign and domestic operations, respectively. Then I subtract the allotted net interest 
income from operating income to compute income available to common shareholders before 
extraordinary items for foreign and domestic operations. 
 
5.2    Empirical Tests and Results 
 The main hypothesis predicts that since foreign investors know better about foreign 
operations of firms, more information about future earnings generated from their foreign 
operations is incorporated into stock prices with higher foreign institutional ownership. To test 
this cross-sectional prediction, this study evaluates the interaction term between foreign 
institutional ownership and realized future earnings from foreign operations in the decomposed 
FERC model. 
 If investors obtain information relevant to future earnings of firms, the information will 
be revealed at least partially into the stock prices by their trading activity and the coefficient on 
realized future earnings will be positive. On the other hand, if no information is revealed in 
current stock prices through investors, the coefficient on realized future earnings will be closer to 
zero. This implies that there is a positive interaction effect between foreign institutional 
ownership and future earnings from foreign operations under the informed investor hypothesis. I 
test the hypothesis with the following regression:  
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                                                                                                                      (4)            
where IO_FORt-1 is the number of shares held by foreign institutions divided by total number of 
shares outstanding at the end of year t-1, Rt is the buy-and-hold return for year t over the 12-
month period ending three months after the year t fiscal year-end. X_FORt-1 (X_DOMt-1) is 
income available to common shareholders before extraordinary items generated from operations 
in foreign countries (in home country) in year t-1 scaled by market value of equity three months 
after the year t-1 fiscal year-end (i.e. at the beginning of current return measurement), X_FORt 
(X_DOMt) is income available to common shareholders before extraordinary items generated 
from operations in foreign countries (in home country) in year t scaled by market value of equity 
three months after the year t-1 fiscal year-end, X3_FORt (X3_DOMt) is the sum of income 
available to common shareholders before extraordinary items for three years following year t 
generated from operations in foreign countries (in home country) scaled by market value of 
equity three months after the year t-1 fiscal year-end, and R3t is the buy-and-hold return for the 
three-year period following year t starting three months after the year t fiscal year-end. 
 I perform ordinary least squares regression (OLS) using model (3) and (4) with 16,935 
firm-year observations across 44 stock markets over the sample period from 2001 to 2010. I 
include only firms that have foreign operations. I correct standard errors for heteroskedasticity 
and firm-level clustering to control for correlation within the same firms. Table 7 shows the 
results of the empirical tests. Column (1) presents the basic decomposed FERC model and 
Column (2) shows the model to test the effect of foreign institutional ownership on the FERC. 
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 Column (1) of Table 7 shows that current returns are significantly positively associated 
with future earnings generated from foreign and domestic operations and significantly negatively 
associated with future returns. The positive coefficients on both future earnings indicate that 
information about future earnings from foreign and domestic operations is incorporated in stock 
prices. The negative coefficient on future returns demonstrates that it removes measurement 
errors in both of realized future earnings.  
 Column (2) of Table 7 shows that foreign institutional ownership significantly affects the 
relation between current returns and future earnings from foreign operations. IO_FORt-1 x 
X3_FORt is significantly positive, which indicates that current returns are more strongly 
associated with future earnings from foreign operations as foreign institutional ownership 
increases. This implies that foreign institutional investors facilitate the incorporation of 
information in current stock prices about future earnings from foreign operations. 
 Following Orpurt and Zang (2009), I add various firm-level control variables individually 
to the regression. To control for differences in information environment, SIZE and the number of 
analysts following a firm (NANAL) are used. Large and high analyst-following firms tend to have 
richer information environment. Since negative future earnings are more difficult to predict than 
positive future earnings which are normal and persistent, I include an indicator variable LOSS, 
which is set to 1 if X3_FORt is negative otherwise 0. Lastly, I include a proxy for volatility of 
future earnings (EARNSTD) since volatile earnings are more difficult to predict. EARNSTD is 
defined as the standard deviation of future earnings from foreign operations for year t+1 through 
t+3. 
 The results appear in Table 8. The coefficients on IO_FORt-1 x X3_FORt remain 
significant for all specifications. Trading activity of foreign institutional investors reveals 
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information about future earnings from foreign operations of firms in current stock prices, even 
after controlling for the determinants of the FERCs which are documented in the accounting 
literature. Interestingly, the coefficients on IO_FORt-1 x X3_DOMt are not significant when 
controlling for SIZE and NANAL, which implies that foreign institutional investors do not have 
an informational advantage on domestic operations of firms controlling for information 
environment of firms.  
 
6    Conclusion 
 This paper proposes a specific channel through which foreign shareholding improves 
stock price informativeness in local stock markets. I find that foreign investors facilitate the 
incorporation of information about foreign operations of MNCs into local stock prices since they 
have an informational advantage to gather and interpret such information due to their geographic 
proximity. The study suggests an informational benefit of financial liberalization contributing to 
the international finance literature about financial market integration. 
  I show that the positive relation between foreign institutional ownership and stock return 
volatility is attenuated as the extent of foreign operations of firms increase. In addition, more 
information about future earnings generated from foreign operations is incorporated into current 
stock prices with higher foreign institutional ownership using the decomposed future earnings 
response coefficient (FERC) model. Furthermore, I find that the type of information that foreign 
investors have is about the demand for a firm’s products rather than about the technology used 
by the firm. This implies the information advantage stems from geographic proximity to the 
location of product markets of the firm’s foreign operations not to the location of its operating 
facilities.  
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 Considering ongoing globalization in corporate investment, the communication of 
information by foreign investors becomes more important to domestic investors and corporate 
managers. The presence of foreign investors facilitates the incorporation of information that 
would not be obtained due to information costs induced by geographic separation. For further 
research, it would be interesting to study whether corporate managers learn information about 
their own foreign operations communicated by foreign investors and such information affects 
their real investment decisions in foreign countries. 
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Figure 1: Foreign Sales and Foreign Assets by Geographic Region 
This figure shows foreign sales and foreign assets by geographic region in 2012. Foreign sales are defined 
as sales generated from operations in foreign countries scaled by total sales. Foreign assets are defined as 
assets of operations in foreign countries scaled by total assets. The countries that comprise each region are 
provided in Appendix B. 
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Figure 2: Foreign Sales and Foreign Assets by Year 
This figure shows foreign sales and foreign assets for developed and emerging markets over the period 
from 2001 to 2012. Foreign sales are defined as sales generated from operations in foreign countries 
scaled by total sales. Foreign assets are defined as assets of operations in foreign countries scaled by total 
assets. The countries that comprise developed and emerging markets are provided in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Sample of Firms and Summary Statistics by Country 
This table provides summary statistics for firms in the sample. I report the number of observations and the average values of firm characteristics 
by country. Panel A reports the number of observations and the average values of firm characteristics for developed markets. Panel B reports the 
number of observations and the average values of firm characteristics for emerging markets. The sample period is from 2001 to 2012. Refer to 
Appendix A for variable definitions.  
 
Panel A: Developed Markets  
Country  N VOL IO_FOR IO_DOM MV ($ mil) MB LEV ROE VOLP DIV  AGE FS FA 
Australia 5,377 0.60 0.03 0.01 1,901 3.01 0.32 -0.07 0.81 0.48 13.02 0.28 0.23 
Austria 570 0.38 0.08 0.02 1,725 1.55 1.04 0.07 0.19 0.69 14.13 0.54 0.40 
Belgium 728 0.32 0.07 0.03 2,921 2.02 0.72 0.10 0.17 0.77 17.40 0.46 0.31 
Canada 2,525 0.98 0.15 0.18 3,510 2.23 0.53 0.02 0.64 0.46 8.91 0.45 0.28 
Denmark 801 0.38 0.04 0.09 2,169 3.09 0.75 0.08 0.27 0.63 18.78 0.47 0.28 
Finland 984 0.36 0.10 0.09 3,544 2.04 0.51 0.08 0.30 0.84 12.32 0.56 0.34 
France 4,463 0.39 0.06 0.04 5,466 1.98 0.75 0.07 0.47 0.71 14.21 0.41 0.26 
Germany 4,075 0.41 0.07 0.04 4,534 1.93 0.74 0.05 0.57 0.62 15.13 0.44 0.27 
Hong Kong 1,710 0.49 0.04 0.01 2,405 2.28 0.39 0.06 0.40 0.67 16.64 0.51 0.37 
Ireland 477 0.47 0.14 0.01 3,002 3.44 0.76 0.04 0.49 0.57 19.27 0.62 0.46 
Israel 1,050 0.45 0.07 0.01 1,370 3.92 0.95 0.05 0.47 0.42 11.22 0.59 0.22 
Italy 1,835 0.36 0.05 0.02 4,086 1.79 1.45 0.02 0.26 0.72 14.95 0.35 0.16 
Japan 15,258 0.39 0.04 0.03 2,462 1.58 0.44 0.05 0.16 0.90 21.51 0.18 0.12 
Netherlands 1,378 0.39 0.13 0.04 6,334 2.40 0.55 0.11 0.44 0.71 19.15 0.58 0.49 
New Zealand 409 0.29 0.03 0.01 601 2.84 0.39 0.10 0.19 0.81 13.12 0.31 0.24 
Norway 833 0.46 0.08 0.10 3,150 3.82 1.24 0.09 0.62 0.60 12.77 0.55 0.36 
Portugal 328 0.33 0.04 0.03 2,978 2.67 1.84 0.12 0.42 0.78 13.05 0.35 0.25 
Singapore 3,095 0.52 0.03 0.01 782 1.54 0.37 0.07 0.44 0.69 13.33 0.50 0.33 
Spain 1,102 0.34 0.06 0.03 8,507 2.48 1.23 0.10 0.27 0.77 14.49 0.34 0.26 
Sweden 1,658 0.39 0.07 0.15 2,765 2.77 0.43 0.08 0.37 0.71 13.07 0.55 0.36 
Switzerland 1,854 0.34 0.09 0.06 8,605 2.36 0.51 0.09 0.24 0.74 17.74 0.53 0.32 
United Kingdom 9,880 0.45 0.04 0.14 4,340 2.93 0.37 0.03 0.87 0.65 18.40 0.39 0.25 
United States 47,434 0.58 0.03 0.40 3,028 2.61 0.63 0.00 1.00 0.39 15.71 0.17 0.07 
Average 4,688 0.44 0.07 0.07 3,486 2.49 0.73 0.06 0.44 0.67 15.14 0.44 0.29 
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Table 1: Continued 
 
Panel B: Emerging Markets 
Country  N VOL IO_FOR IO_DOM MV ($ mil) MB LEV ROE VOLP DIV  AGE FS FA 
Brazil 1,136 0.42 0.10 0.01 3,721 7.99 0.70 0.17 0.44 0.84 10.52 0.10 0.01 
Chile 225 0.26 0.03 0.00 3,808 14.97 0.26 0.14 0.09 0.97 15.59 0.47 0.28 
China 1,984 0.46 0.02 0.01 2,079 3.46 0.48 0.05 0.28 0.37 10.81 0.14 0.01 
Colombia 19 0.29 0.01 0.00 2,434 1.34 0.80 0.05 0.03 0.95 13.68 0.27 0.12 
Czech Republic 59 0.41 0.07 0.01 4,363 2.24 0.65 0.08 0.19 0.56 12.00 0.35 0.18 
Egypt 174 0.42 0.04 0.00 1,389 2.40 0.25 0.19 0.18 0.85 9.84 0.06 0.06 
Greece 739 0.55 0.04 0.00 1,073 1.52 1.31 0.01 0.33 0.72 13.68 0.28 0.14 
Hungary 154 0.32 0.12 0.01 1,860 2.03 0.53 0.10 0.13 0.57 11.06 0.33 0.18 
India 8,633 0.52 0.02 0.02 904 2.17 0.96 0.15 0.31 0.72 12.76 0.12 0.04 
Indonesia 1,157 0.54 0.03 0.00 995 3.82 0.74 0.13 0.69 0.49 13.50 0.08 0.02 
Malaysia 4,784 0.44 0.01 0.00 366 1.14 0.42 0.05 0.28 0.64 13.70 0.19 0.11 
Mexico 405 0.38 0.06 0.00 5,616 4.45 0.63 0.10 0.14 0.60 13.19 0.38 0.34 
Peru 73 0.38 0.06 0.00 2,642 3.96 0.30 0.23 0.12 0.82 13.19 0.27 0.17 
Philippines 304 0.44 0.05 0.00 807 3.14 0.42 0.13 0.40 0.61 15.69 0.12 0.10 
Poland 753 0.43 0.04 0.19 888 1.88 0.38 0.10 0.27 0.50 8.93 0.17 0.06 
Russia 244 0.46 0.07 0.00 9,720 8.19 1.09 0.20 0.89 0.69 6.54 0.15 0.04 
South Africa 1,134 0.35 0.06 0.04 3,032 3.00 0.21 0.20 0.34 0.83 16.31 0.26 0.20 
South Korea 1,444 0.49 0.05 0.00 2,436 1.31 0.81 0.06 0.29 0.76 16.73 0.30 0.14 
Taiwan 3,323 0.42 0.04 0.01 1,376 1.74 0.25 0.08 0.12 0.69 12.49 0.37 0.23 
Thailand 1,700 0.41 0.02 0.00 361 1.51 0.57 0.09 0.52 0.70 14.93 0.11 0.04 
Turkey 712 0.48 0.14 0.01 1,300 3.84 0.30 0.11 0.32 0.56 14.60 0.09 0.06 
Average 1,388 0.42 0.05 0.02 2,437 3.62 0.57 0.12 0.30 0.69 12.84 0.22 0.12 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
This table reports summary statistics of firm characteristics for all firms in the sample. The sample period 
is from 2001 to 2012. Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. 
 
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Q1 Median Q3 Max. 
Dependent Variable                 
log(VOL)t 136,980 -0.875 0.575 -2.174 -1.272 -0.916 -0.523 0.824 
         Ownership Variables 
        IO_FORt-1 136,980 0.040 0.087 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.042 1.000 
IO_DOMt-1 136,980 0.167 0.272 0.000 0.000 0.023 0.196 1.000 
         Control Variables 
        SIZEt-1 136,980 5.478 2.217 0.255 3.930 5.412 6.970 10.572 
MBt-1 136,980 2.430 4.453 -6.121 0.789 1.404 2.527 34.381 
LEVt-1 136,980 0.597 1.404 0.000 0.005 0.145 0.523 9.927 
ROEt-1 136,980 0.044 0.477 -2.665 -0.001 0.083 0.176 2.002 
VOLPt-1 136,980 0.619 2.133 0.008 0.050 0.108 0.266 17.208 
DIVt-1 136,980 0.588 0.492 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
log(1+AGE)t 136,980 2.621 0.642 0.000 2.197 2.639 3.091 3.892 
         Interacting Variables 
        FSt 136,980 0.259 0.315 0.000 0.000 0.106 0.476 1.000 
FAt 113,216 0.142 0.235 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.198 0.986 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Correlation Coefficients  
This table shows correlation coefficients of key variables. The sample period is from 2001 to 2012. The variable definitions are provided in 
Appendix A. The p-values are reported in parentheses. 
 
  log(VOL) IO_FOR IO_DOM SIZE MB LEV ROE VOLP DIV log(1+AGE) 
log(VOL) 
          
           IO_FOR -0.062 
         
 
(0.000) 
         IO_DOM -0.046 -0.007 
        
 
(0.000) (0.012) 
        SIZE -0.427 0.368 0.304 
       
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
       MB -0.002 0.067 0.040 0.171 
      
 
(0.536) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      LEV 0.119 -0.046 -0.059 -0.099 -0.135 
     
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000 
     ROE -0.209 0.064 0.029 0.193 -0.011 -0.071 
    
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    VOLP 0.246 -0.044 -0.036 -0.170 0.081 0.009 -0.092 
   
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
   DIV -0.459 0.116 -0.134 0.381 -0.030 -0.039 0.211 -0.227 
  
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
  log(1+AGE) -0.196 0.048 0.080 0.203 -0.068 0.007 0.055 -0.141 0.202 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
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Table 4: The Effect of Foreign Sales on the Relation between Foreign Institutional 
Ownership and Volatility 
This table shows results of panel regressions of the log of volatility on foreign institutional ownership 
conditional on foreign sales and the tertile membership of foreign sales. The sample period is from 2001 
to 2012. I run fixed effect regressions including country, industry and year dummies. The standard errors 
are corrected for firm-level clustering. The explanatory variables are all lagged by one period except the 
log of one plus age, foreign sales and the tertile membership of foreign sales. The definitions of all 
variables are provided in Appendix A. The standard errors are reported in parentheses. *,**,*** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
IO_FORt-1 0.455*** 0.688*** 0.597*** 
 
(0.035) (0.047) (0.054) 
IO_FORt-1 x FSt 
 
-0.535*** 
 
  
(0.074) 
 IO_FORt-1 x TERTILE2t 
  
0.020 
   
(0.082) 
IO_FORt-1 x TERTILE3t 
  
-0.268*** 
   
(0.065) 
IO_DOMt-1 -0.126*** -0.132*** -0.140*** 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
SIZEt-1 -0.069*** -0.074*** -0.074*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
MBt-1 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LEVt-1 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
ROEt-1 -0.089*** -0.087*** -0.088*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
VOLPt-1 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
DIVt-1 -0.300*** -0.296*** -0.297*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
log(1+AGE)t -0.033*** -0.032*** -0.034*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
FSt 
 
0.132*** 
 
  
(0.008) 
 TERTILE2t 
  
0.045*** 
   
(0.006) 
TERTILE3t 
  
0.095*** 
   
(0.006) 
Observations 136,980 136,980 136,980 
Adj. R
2
 0.479 0.482 0.482 
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Table 5: The Determinants of the Relation between Foreign Institutional Ownership and 
Volatility 
This table shows results of panel regressions of the log of volatility on foreign institutional ownership 
conditional on foreign sales and foreign assets. The sample period is from 2001 to 2012. I run fixed effect 
regressions including country, industry and year dummies. The standard errors are corrected for firm-
level clustering. The explanatory variables are all lagged by one period except the log of one plus age, 
foreign sales and foreign assets. The definitions of all variables are provided in Appendix A. The standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
IO_FORt-1 0.688*** 0.551*** 0.698*** 
 
(0.047) (0.045) (0.050) 
IO_FORt-1 x FSt -0.535*** 
 
-0.615*** 
 
(0.074) 
 
(0.095) 
IO_FORt-1 x FAt 
 
-0.303*** 0.171 
  
(0.098) (0.118) 
IO_DOMt-1 -0.132*** -0.107*** -0.114*** 
 
(0.011) (0.013) (0.012) 
SIZEt-1 -0.074*** -0.077*** -0.079*** 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
MBt-1 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LEVt-1 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
ROEt-1 -0.087*** -0.084*** -0.083*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
VOLPt-1 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
DIVt-1 -0.296*** -0.303*** -0.301*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
log(1+AGE)t -0.032*** -0.031*** -0.031*** 
 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
FSt 0.132*** 
 
0.104*** 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.010) 
FAt 
 
0.154*** 0.070*** 
  
(0.011) (0.013) 
Observations 136,980 113,216 113,216 
Adj. R
2
 0.482 0.490 0.491 
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Table 6: Summary Statistics and Correlation Coefficients of Variables in the Analysis of 
the Future Earnings Response Coefficients 
This table provides summary statistics and correlation coefficients of variables used in the analysis of the 
future earnings response coefficients. Panel A reports summary statistics for all firms in the sample. Panel 
B reports correlation coefficients for all firms in the sample. The sample period is from 2001 to 2010. 
Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. 
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Q1 Median Q3 Max. 
Rt 16,935 0.167 0.609 -0.898 -0.191 0.079 0.382 3.771 
X_FORt-1 16,935 0.016 0.075 -0.316 -0.000 0.014 0.040 0.213 
X_DOMt-1 16,935 0.014 0.220 -2.843 0.000 0.038 0.075 0.591 
X_FORt 16,935 0.021 0.077 -0.300 -0.000 0.017 0.047 0.247 
X_DOMt 16,935 0.026 0.184 -2.527 0.000 0.041 0.081 0.732 
X3_FORt 16,935 0.119 0.236 -0.408 0.004 0.067 0.183 0.955 
X3_DOMt 16,935 0.147 0.505 -4.498 0.008 0.135 0.284 3.055 
R3t 16,935 0.460 1.192 -0.999 -0.266 0.189 0.792 7.556 
IO_FORt-1 16,935 0.046 0.092 0.000 0.001 0.016 0.055 1.000 
SIZEt-1 16,711 6.436 2.209 -0.342 4.892 6.390 8.030 10.623 
log(1+NANAL)t-1 16,935 1.288 1.082 0.000 0.000 1.099 2.197 3.850 
LOSSt 16,935 0.223 0.416 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
EARNSTDt 16,935 0.048 0.077 0.000 0.008 0.020 0.050 0.403 
 
Panel B: Correlation Coefficients 
  Rt X_FORt-1 X_DOMt-1 X_FORt X_DOMt X3_FORt X3_DOMt R3t 
Rt                 
         X_FORt-1 -0.047 
       
 
(0.000) 
       X_DOMt-1 -0.044 0.010 
      
 
(0.000) (0.215) 
      X_FORt 0.125 0.520 0.096 
     
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     X_DOMt 0.058 0.088 0.529 -0.080 
    
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    X3_FORt 0.251 0.315 0.010 0.465 0.027 
   
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.197) (0.000) (0.001) 
   X3_DOMt 0.174 0.020 0.323 0.026 0.448 -0.032 
  
 
(0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
  R3t -0.090 -0.014 -0.036 -0.012 -0.014 0.243 0.207 
   (0.000) (0.079) (0.000) (0.117) (0.069) (0.000) (0.000)   
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Table 7: Regressions of Current Returns on Future Earnings from Foreign Operations and 
Interactions with Foreign Institutional Ownership 
This table shows results of Ordinary Least Squares regression estimation results. The sample period is 
from 2001 to 2010. Column (1) reports the estimates of the following regression:  
                                              
                                                                                                                                                           
Column (2) reports the estimates of the above regression including interactions with foreign institutional 
ownership. Foreign institutional ownership is lagged by one period. The definitions of all variables are 
provided in Appendix A. The standard errors corrected for firm-level clustering are reported in 
parentheses. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
 
 
(1) (2) 
X_FORt-1 -1.703*** -1.790*** 
 
(0.129) (0.141) 
X_DOMt-1 -0.471*** -0.515*** 
 
(0.064) (0.067) 
X_FORt 0.653*** 0.834*** 
 
(0.139) (0.149) 
X_DOMt 0.123* 0.230*** 
 
(0.072) (0.073) 
X3_FORt 0.891***  0.838*** 
 
(0.039)  (0.043) 
X3_DOMt 0.331***  0.307*** 
 
(0.027)  (0.028) 
R3t -0.122*** -0.115*** 
 
(0.006)  (0.006) 
IO_FORt-1 
 
-0.170* 
  
(0.092) 
IO_FORt-1 x X_FORt-1 
 
2.837** 
  
(1.313) 
IO_FORt-1 x X_DOMt-1 
 
2.213** 
  
(1.123) 
IO_FORt-1 x X_FORt 
 
-5.351*** 
  
(1.396) 
IO_FORt-1 x X_DOMt 
 
-4.402*** 
  
(1.110) 
IO_FORt-1 x X3_FORt 
 
1.415*** 
  
(0.383) 
IO_FORt-1 x X3_DOMt 
 
0.961*** 
  
(0.373) 
IO_FORt-1 x R3t 
 
-0.198*** 
  
(0.065) 
Observations 16,935 16,935 
Adj. R
2
 0.186 0.192 
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Table 8: Regressions of Current Returns on Future Earnings from Foreign Operations and 
Interactions with Foreign Institutional Ownership and Controls for the Determinants of 
the Future Earnings Response Coefficients 
This table shows results of Ordinary Least Squares regression estimation results. The sample period is 
from 2001 to 2010. The columns report the estimates of the following regression including interactions 
with foreign institutional ownership and 4 different control variables: 
                                              
                                                                                                                                                           
Foreign institutional ownership, size and the log of one plus the number of analysts are lagged by one 
period. The definitions of all variables are provided in Appendix A. The standard errors are corrected for 
firm-level clustering. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  SIZEt-1 log(1+NANAL)t-1 LOSSt EARNSTDt 
X_FORt-1 -1.736***     -1.818***     -1.736***     -1.898***  
X_DOMt-1  -0.568***      -0.501***      -0.408***     -0.733***  
X_FORt 1.264***    1.223***     0.843***     1.124***   
X_DOMt   0.391***   0.317***     0.252***    0.421***  
X3_FORt  0.648***   0.693***    1.089***    0.806***   
X3_DOMt  0.172***    0.224***      0.382***   0.499*** 
R3t  -0.104***   -0.096***    -0.126***   -0.133***  
IO_FORt-1  0.171*   -0.005    -0.149*     -0.128 
IO_FORt-1 x X_FORt-1  2.989**     3.122**    2.430**      2.491** 
IO_FORt-1 x X_DOMt-1  1.759     2.243*     1.841*   1.824* 
IO_FORt-1 x X_FORt  -4.748***    -4.067***     -4.798***     -4.581*** 
IO_FORt-1 x X_DOMt  -4.152***   -3.531***    -3.883***   -3.606*** 
IO_FORt-1 x X3_FORt 1.065***     0.825**      1.225***    1.236***  
IO_FORt-1 x X3_DOMt 0.520    0.178     0.889**     0.710*    
IO_FORt-1 x R3t -0.196***     -0.147**      -0.183***    -0.152** 
Control -0.041***    -0.041***   -0.020   1.485***     
Control x X_FORt-1 0.025 0.060 0.252   2.025*   
Control x X_DOMt-1 0.029 -0.007 -0.057   1.422***  
Control x X_FORt -0.079  -0.525***  0.216 -0.836 
Control x X_DOMt -0.029   -0.162**    0.086  -0.955**  
Control x X3_FORt 0.036*    0.193***    -1.691***     -0.896***   
Control x X3_DOMt 0.032**     0.143***     -0.242***      -0.981***    
Control x R3t -0.003   -0.023***    0.041***   0.077 
 
Observations   16,711 16,935 16,935 16,935 
Adj. R
2
 0.210 0.203 0.222 0.230 
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APPENDIX A: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 
Variable Name Description 
Dependent Variables 
VOLt standard deviation of weekly returns multiplied by     in year t 
log(VOL)t log of standard deviation of weekly returns multiplied by     in year t 
  
Ownership Variables 
IO_FORt-1 number of shares held by foreign institutions divided by total number of shares 
outstanding at the end of year t-1 
IO_DOMt-1 number of shares held by domestic institutions divided by total number of 
shares outstanding at the end of year t-1 
  
Control Variables 
MVt-1 market value of equity ($ mil) at the end of year t-1 
SIZEt-1 log of market value of equity ($ mil) at the end of year t-1 
MBt-1 market value of equity divided by book value of equity in year t-1 
LEVt-1 long-term debt divided by market value of equity in year t-1 
ROEt-1 net income before extraordinary items in year t-1 divided by book value of 
equity at the end of year t-2 
VOLPt-1 standard deviation of ROEs using the previous 6 years of data for year t-1 
DIVt-1 indicator variable set to 1 if the firm pays dividends and 0 if the firm does not 
pay dividends in year t-1 
AGEt number of years since firms appear on Datastream in year t 
log(1+AGE)t log of one plus the number of years since firms appear on Datastream in year t 
  
Interacting Variables 
FSt foreign sales divided by total sales in year t 
FAt foreign assets divided by total assets in year t 
  
Variables in the Future Earnings Response Coefficient Regressions 
Rt buy-and-hold return for year t over the 12-month period ending three months 
after the year t fiscal year-end 
R3t buy-and-hold return for the three-year period following year t starting three 
months after the year t fiscal year-end 
X_FORt-1 foreign operating income less net interest expense allocated to foreign 
operations in year t-1 scaled by market value of equity three months after the 
year t-1 fiscal year-end 
X_FORt foreign operating income less net interest expense allocated to foreign 
operations in year t scaled by market value of equity three months after the year 
t-1 fiscal year-end 
X3_FORt sum of foreign operating income less net interest expense allocated to foreign 
operations for 3-year period from year t+1 to year t+3 scaled by market value of 
equity three months after the year t-1 fiscal year-end 
X_DOMt-1 domestic operating income less net interest expense allocated to domestic 
operations in year t-1 scaled by market value of equity three months after the 
year t-1 fiscal year-end 
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X_DOMt domestic operating income less net interest expense allocated to domestic 
operations in year t scaled by market value of equity three months after the year 
t-1 fiscal year-end 
X3_DOMt sum of domestic operating income less net interest expense allocated to 
domestic operations for 3-year period from year t+1 to year t+3 scaled by 
market value of equity three months after the year t-1 fiscal year-end 
NANALt-1 number of analysts following the firm at the end of year t-1 
log(1+NANAL)t-1 log of one plus the number of analysts following the firm at the end of year t-1 
LOSSt variable set to1 if X3_FORt is negative, and 0 otherwise 
EARNSTDt standard deviation of X_FOR for year t through t+3 
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APPENDIX B: THE LIST OF COUNTRIES BY GEOGRAPHIC REGION 
 
Europe 
Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom 
 
Middle East & Africa 
Egypt, Israel, South Africa, Turkey 
 
Asia Pacific 
Australia, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, 
Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand 
 
North America 
Canada, Mexico, United States 
 
South America 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru 
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